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Overview 
This module will give you a brief overview of renewable and non-renewable resources, resource 
exploitation and stewardship challenges. It is important to focus on analytical concepts and 
approaches to problem solving because it will enable you to gain an essential understanding of 
how to manage resource extraction and resource use and the resulting environmental effects. 
We will also use an interdisciplinary approach in presenting the concepts in this module. That is 
to say, we use many different disciplines to explain resource extraction and management.   
The module begins by briefly explaining the distinction between renewable and non-renewable 
natural resources in the context of common property, and the differences in how resources are 
managed. The module then examines three different resource management models, 
international cooperation, and constraints to implementing international policy at the local level.  
 
Learning Objectives & Outcomes 
Upon completion of this module you should be able to: 
1. Understand common pool resources and the logic of “the tragedy of the commons.” 
 
2. Explore the relationships between different economic adaptation and management 
needs. 
 
3. Describe the differences among the three main resource management models: state 
authority, market driven and resource co-management. 
 
4. Summarize the details for basic international cooperation for sustainable development. 
 
5. Evaluate the constraints to implementing the precautionary principle. 
 
Required Readings 
Caulfield, Richard A. 2004. “Resource Governance” In: Arctic Human Development Report. New 
York: United Nations Development Programme [UNDP]. P122-138. 
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Key Terms and Concepts 
• Adaptive management 
• Co-management 
• Collective rationality 
• Common pool resources 
• Ecosystem management 
• Ecosystems 
• Individual rationality 
• Limited access 
• Market resource governance 
• Participatory resource governance 
• Open access 
• Precautionary principle 
• Private property 
• Public governance 
• Public property 
• Resource rent 
• Stewardship 
• Tenure 
• Tragedy of the Commons 
Learning Materials 
Introduction 
The need for resource management models and resource stewardship, in general, depends on 
the state of the resource and the degree of resource exploitation. The Circumpolar North has a 
rich history of resource exploitation, causing formerly robust ecosystems to become more fragile. 
In the past, natural resources were somewhat protected by remoteness - distance to more 
populated areas - and the lack of extraction technology. That is no longer the case. Both modern 
technology and climate change have increased extraction and use of northern resources. 
Like the dependence on marine resources for the early settlements of Newfoundland, we find 
that the whole of the many coastal communities in the north have been inseparably linked to 
natural resources both marine and terrestrial. For example, even though most of northern 
Norway is located north of the Arctic Circle, the winters are relatively mild and the climate is 
conducive to farming. Furthermore, since historic times we find that fishing is often combined 
with farming and reindeer husbandry, of which many different ethnic groups have adopted both. 
Similarly, people are reliant on natural resources whether they live settled or nomadic lifestyles. 
With such sparse populations and rich natural resources, the Circumpolar North became 
attractive to resource exploitation by southerners. The first visitors and later settlers from the 
south made use of resources for profit rather than subsistence. In northern Canada the 
Hudson’s Bay Company and the North West Company gradually expanded their activities into 
the northern interior, establishing permanent outposts for further economic expansion. At the 
eastern coast French and English fishermen from the early 1500s onward exploited rich cod 
resources. Such exploitation patterns were also true for the Siberian traders who settled in the 
1600s on the coast of Alaska. But what really transformed the earlier pristine land of the interior 
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and the living conditions for the inhabitations, was the gold rush at the turn of the 19th century. 
Rumors of gold in the Yukon in 1896 drew people from the south, resulting in rapid growth of 
communities and economic activities along the Yukon River and its tributaries. This changed 
both the landscape and gradually, the lives of the peoples living in the affected areas.  
The transformation of the northern economies took place in different ways and at different rates. 
At the turn of the 17th Century, industrialization led to the emergence of market economies. The 
growing exploitation of non-renewable natural resources greatly affected renewable resource 
systems. Habitats were degraded and even destroyed and many species were overharvested to 
the point of extinction. Rapid enhancements of technology such as greater sized vessels, and 
more efficient fishing and hunting gear substantially increased pressures on resources. 
Additionally, what was once a subsistence activity became commercial. For example, in Russia, 
after the 1917 revolution reindeer herding was industrialized. 
Traditional ways of exploiting northern resources gave way to more efficient and industrialized 
resource exploitation. In most cases, the problem of overuse can be attributed to rapidly 
increasing demand and exploitation, and a system of common property, or open access. A 
spectacular example of overuse can be found in the world’s fisheries. More specifically in 
Norway, fishing efforts increased beginning in the 1960s and commercial stocks of both herring 
and cod soon began showing signs of over-exploitation and even collapse. At the end of the 
sixties a licensing system for herring fisheries was introduced although it was too late; the stock 
collapsed and a fishing moratorium was introduced to help the herring stock recover. Similarly, 
the Norwegian arctic cod stock suffered from the same plight and fishing was eventually 
restricted by licensing and quotas. By the early nineties a severe resource crisis occurred and 
historic low total allowable catch quotas (TAC) had to be set. The overall result was that the 
Norwegian government adopted a regulative system to safeguard fisheries resources and 
prevent a total fisheries collapse. 
Another important issue affecting the demand for and access to northern resources is climate 
change. Due to milder winters and a retreating ice cap in the Arctic, the possibilities for resource 
exploitation have been improved. This is pertinent for oil and gas exploration in areas formerly 
technically inaccessible for commercial activities. The biggest reserves of unexploited petroleum 
resources are estimated to exist in the Circumpolar North. Despite the search for alternative 
energy resources, oil and gas resources are still dominant because they are relatively 
inexpensive to harness and use to date. The Barents Sea, home to the Russian gas field known 
as Shtockman, is a case in point. 
As areas become more accessible, natural resource ownership in the Circumpolar North has 
become a new concern on the political agenda. Vast areas of the Arctic have largely been 
international, not belonging to any nation state. This is about to change. The availability and 
importance of natural resources for economic development have sparked a debate and the 
beginnings of legal processes to extend national jurisdictions. The planting of the Russian flag 
on the seabed of the North Pole serves as a poignant illustration. Oil and gas are presently 
important ingredients of energy policy, and when big powers are affected, this turns into vital 
interests and high policy, calling for solutions by the international community. 
The United Nations has taken the lead in finding solutions to such an issue. Arctic nation states 
have extended jurisdictions of the adjacent sea areas, from four nautical miles to twelve, then to 
200 nautical miles by establishing exclusive economic zones. The Arctic countries are now 
pressing for an additional extension of their sea borders, to be able to secure and protect 
resources on connected via the continental shelf. With the increased focus on petroleum 
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resources under the sea, new sea borders and treaties are required to avoid future conflicts and 
resource depletion. Not only in the Barents Sea between Norway and Russia are there border 
disputes, but also between the US and Canada, and Canada and Greenland/Denmark to 
mention some of the most pressing ones. Such questions are also subject for handling by the 
United Nations, building on the Law of the Sea and the Convention on the Continental Shelf 
(1958). 
 
8.1. Common Pool Resources 
Natural resources are classified as renewable or non-renewable. All renewable resources are 
biological and are able to reproduce as long as their environments are healthy and conducive to 
reproduction. It is important to consider that renewable resources are also part of larger systems 
of resources that depend on each other; one layer often forms the base of existence for other 
layers. Together they form a complex chain of interdependence, often difficult to define given 
such complexity. Interference in the way of extraction or manipulation in these systems might 
easily offset the balance with irreversible effects such as the inability to reproduce in a 
sustainable way, depending on fragility or robustness. Today we find that both marine and land-
based ecosystems in the north have changed their character from former robustness to being 
more fragile and stressed. Non-renewable resources are those that cannot reproduce, such as 
oil and gas, and minerals. Non-renewable resources are finite. 
Access to natural resources has been a driving force for industrialization and economic growth 
throughout the Circumpolar North. But it should be added that these resources have been 
important for economic growth wherever there is a demand for them, and that northern 
resources have been an important source for economic growth in southern, more densely 
populated areas. Resources may be carried a long way from where they are found and do not 
necessarily provide economic growth to the areas where they were caught or extracted. In 
today's economy, we have reached a level of use, organization and technology that enables us 
to look for resources that earlier could not be exploited. In our globalized economy, distance no 
longer provides barriers to or protection from exploitation. 
Natural resource use and rates of use are often governed by who owns, and who has access to 
a resource. There are four primary ways of holding or accessing a resource known as tenure: 
1. Open access: provides access to a resource where there are no limitations as to who 
can use a resource or benefit from it. Often there is no jurisdiction over such resources, 
making management difficult. 
2. Common pool resources: are held or accessed by a defined group sometimes known 
as the commons. That is to say, there are a limited number of stakeholders who can 
access the resource and use it. What is important to note is that common pool resources 
are sometimes referred to as open access and possess the same characteristics when 
the size of the commons becomes very large and unmanageable 
3. Public property: is owned and governed by the state. In this case, public authorities are 
owners and establish rules and regulations regarding use and access.  
4. Private property: Property or resources held privately are the most secure and usually 
provide the greatest incentive for responsible and sustainable management and 
extraction. Private property confers all benefits to a private owner of a resource who can 
exclude others from use or extraction, and who is fully responsible and liable for the 
benefits and costs associated with that resource. 
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You will note that resource tenures such as public and private are associated with “rights.” 
Schlager and Ostrom in the “Rights to Nature” (1996), describe five sub-categories of rights as 
sticks in a bundle; access, withdrawal, management, exclusion and alienation. In many cases, 
individuals or groups who have rights to a resource do not have all subcategories, and some 
individuals have only limited access. 
The sea and its resources provide a good example of the range of rights from open access to 
common pool access and public tenure. Hugo Grotius, the founder of the concept Mare 
Liberum—the unrestricted use of oceans, or freedom of the oceans—prevailed until the nation 
states started to expand their national control of sea territories. Both by unilateral and 
coordinated action in the wake of international agreements, the sea territories have been 
expanded to the present exclusive economic zones (EEZ), stretching 200 nautical miles (370 
km) into the sea. Beyond the 200-mile limit, waters are international and, therefore, open 
access, making it difficult to monitor or control sustainable marine resource exploitation. 
Looking at open access more closely and what it means for northern resources, we turn to one 
of the most quoted references in the literature: Garrett Hardin’s article “The Tragedy of the 
Commons”. Hardin argues that in a situation where there is 
a collective right to exploit an unmanaged natural resource, 
the stakeholder will act to maximize his personal profit by 
overexploiting the resource, thus leading to depletion of that 
resource. If an individual restrains their own exploitation or 
harvest, it will benefit only the other stakeholders. Therefore, 
the rational behavior as an economic actor is to maximize 
your own efforts and to harvest as much of the resource as 
possible. This is described as short-term individual rational 
action. And, even though you know your own behavior will 
lead to resource depletion, you would follow the short-
termed individual rationality as long as the other resource 
users are behaving the same way. Hardin uses cattle 
owners and overgrazing as an example. 
The challenge is to be able to use natural resources in a 
long-term and sustainable way. To do this, we must discuss 
collective action and collective rationality. According to the 
economist Olson (1965), individuals in larger groups will not 
act to produce collective goods (i.e. goods for the whole 
group) without well-defined regulations. Furthermore, the 
bigger the group, the less inclined individuals will be to work 
for collective benefits. Putting restraints on your own actions 
would imply taking on individual transaction costs for the 
benefit of the whole group. Access to a collective good often 
results in the free-rider problem, whereby individuals receive 
benefits for which they did not have to work. For example, if 
one fisherman restrained his or her actions and reduced the 
catch so as to increase the overall fish population, a second 
fisherman would benefit in that there would be more fish.  
Ostrom (1990) follows up the free-rider argument by stating 
that an individual who cannot be excluded from the 
commons has no incentive to work voluntarily to provide the 
Learning Activity 1: 
Resources Tenure 
 
Think about natural 
resources - who owns 
them, and who can benefit 
from them. Provide an 
example of a natural 
resource that is held as (a) 
open access, (b) common 
property, (c) public 
property, (d) private 
property. 
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Learning Activity 2:  
Video  
 
Watch the video of  
Garnett Hardin explaining 
"the tragedy of the 
Commons and 
Resources." Website: 
http://www.youtube.com/w
atch?v=L8gAMFTAt2M 
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common good. Or by putting it in economic terms, there is a lack of incentives to sustain a 
renewable natural resource. Free-riding then easily becomes the preferred individual strategy 
and short-term rationality that leads to gradual resource depletion. Therefore, where individual 
strategies are followed, resources often become depleted and degraded, or worse, extinct. 
Group theories like Hardin’s tragedy of the commons and Olson’s theory on collective action are 
only theoretical approaches to dilemmas we face in real life. While they both provide extreme 
examples, they are important contributions to help 
understand what drives people to over-harvest and act 
unsustainably, even at their own demise. They are, in other 
words, analytical tools. 
We come now to the concept of resource rent. Natural 
resources can often be exploited at a level that does not 
threaten sustainability or lead to depletion, and the 
revenues we collect from using these resources are called 
“rent.” Resource rent is the value of what stakeholders or 
users harvest. With increasing use and overexploitation, 
rents gradually decline and can become negative. To avoid 
negative rents caused from overexploitation, and to act in 
the best interests of the collective rather than the individual, 
we must consider regulations. We turn now to examine who should benefit from regulations and 
who are the stakeholders; who should set regulations (private or public institutions); the 
necessary scientific information needed to manage sustainably; and the extent to which 
regulations will be observed when resources are held in common, such as in international 
waters. 
8.2. Economic Adaptation and Management Needs 
Deliberate sustainable management presupposes sufficient knowledge about the users, 
resources and the resource systems of which they form a part. This is challenging because 
knowledge is costly and takes time to gather or accrue. Moreover a resource system is not 
necessarily domestic, but may span other countries, thus implying multi-national use. To provide 
knowledge, which resource users can agree on as the accepted platform for management and 
regulatory measures, could thus affect national and international interests. Regardless of 
jurisdiction, sufficient knowledge is a critical factor in determining how to manage a resource. 
Furthermore, knowledge will provide information regarding necessary resource extraction 
restrictions, and how to adapt to changing resource availability. 
As an example of adaptive management, where ecosystem management is flexible and can be 
adjusted to changes in the environment, consider societies with a long tradition of resource use. 
First, not all knowledge-based actions have to be founded in modern western science. 
Knowledge could be inherited, passed on orally through successive generations, or learned by 
observing actions rather than written words. Indigenous peoples are often said to belong to such 
a tradition of knowledge transfers and manage resources accordingly. There are many 
examples in the literature of common pool resources that are managed as a commons based on 
a local code of ethics, religion and traditional values. Such traditional knowledge often influences 
behavior in a way that favors long-term resource and community sustainability. Moreover, when 
the common group is relatively small and isolated, social control often works to influence human 
behavior with respect to resource use and overuse. Such situations are not likely to happen in 
bigger communities and resource user groups leading to the “tragedy” of overuse. 
Learning Activity 3: 
Adaptive 
Management 
 
How would climate 
change affect adaptive 
management of marine 
resources? 
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Adaptive management frequently requires harvesting restrictions that allocate resources as they 
become increasingly scarce with growing economic demand. New restrictions often give rise to 
concerns about fairness and equality. Should, for instance, local users with traditional 
adaptations bear the same costs as external, industrial resource exploiters? Is it fair that all 
users bear the costs of regulations? Are relatively new users treated the same as traditional and 
long-term users? Any restrictions must be legitimized in a democratic society. The motivation to 
abide by rules is to a great extent dependent on the degree of perceived legitimacy, being fair or 
not. Similarly, effective monitoring and legal prosecution is necessary for offenders who 
disregard rules. 
How do we achieve legitimate regulative regimes to promote resource sustainability through 
adaptive management?  
1. Relevant knowledge, whether science-based, traditional or a blend of the two, is 
essential in forming the knowledge base from which to build. Additionally, shared 
understanding and agreement of facts are essential to collaborate. Sometimes external 
and independent scientific advisory bodies are needed, for example, the International 
Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES), to give advice on the present state of a 
resource.  
2. Another source of legitimacy is procedural, which pertains to the way regulations are 
decided on, monitored and revised. Rule compliance is most often dependent on the 
rules being made and how they are implemented; rules have to be justified out of 
legitimate procedures. 
3. Legitimacy is associated with the degree of participation in making regulatory policies 
and/or in implementing them. A community-based management regime where those 
bearing the costs of regulations are also responsible for influencing rules and 
implementation will be regarded as more legitimate and efficient than external bodies 
without any local influence. The latter is often less cost effective by demanding more 
monitoring and control.  
4. Another type of legitimacy stems from outcomes. If a policy works well and is seen as 
functional for those being targeted, it will be more readily accepted. Note that in reality, 
legitimacy stems from a combination of the types outlined above. 
8.3. Resource Management Models 
Up to this point, we have discussed the challenges to sustaining resources held in common, and 
the need for restrictions to promote sustainability and prevent resource collapse. The lack of 
regulations not only leads to over-exploitation and depletion, but it could also lead to economic 
collapse. When resources are diminishing, users compensate by increasing exploitation and 
harvesting efforts, leading to over-capitalization and a miss-match between harvest efforts and 
economic gains. This is why regulations must be introduced to secure economic and ecological 
sustainability. In the following section we present three resource management models that rely 
on different forces to regulate use. 
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1. Public Governance 
The public governance model, also known as the state management model, is rooted in the 
political-administrative system and is used to formulate and implement policies that respond to 
the public’s needs and demands. The state as an actor, in principle, 
• Holds authority 
• Is legitimate 
• Makes and abolishes laws 
• Is responsible for resource management, monitoring and rule adjudication. 
Public governance is also supposed to play an impartial role when conflicting private interests 
are involved, and have established procedures for solving conflicts. And, by the rule of law there 
exists accountability. The state also has the authority to use force to implement legally based 
policies to prevent “tragedy of the commons”. In short, the state or public authorities are 
expected to intervene in situations where individual human action might cause damage to the 
collective. 
Resources could also be managed through bilateral and international agreements, whereby the 
state is the legitimate actor and represents or authorizes representation to develop solutions. 
The state could also own land and control resource use and exploitation. Indigenous peoples 
sometimes manage vast areas of land in the north, although such land is often controlled by the 
state. This is the case in Nunavut, a territory in northern Canada. Another example is rights to 
marine resources. The Law of the Sea gives nations control of resources within 200-nautical 
mile exclusive economic zones.  
While public resource governance can be the best management option in some cases, it is not 
without fault. The rule of law (as it is also called) can be a lengthy political and administrative 
process that isn’t conducive to efficient or effective solutions. Similarly, it is often encumbered by 
bureaucratic rigidity, sector conflicts and coordination challenges. And, with complex problems 
there are often information and knowledge gaps making the state model inadequate for solving 
resource conflicts. Furthermore, political-administrative solutions are formed in political 
environments and are subject to political pressure from stakeholders and user groups, which 
vary according to political system. For example, the Nordic countries are known for their 
consensus-oriented political style, which differs for instance with the Russian political system 
that has a far more complex governmental structure. Regardless of the political system, state 
resource management policies can be biased towards influential lobby groups and holds no 
guarantee for being balanced and impartial. Finally, monitoring and control activities are 
dependent on public budgets and the state’s capacity to deal with the monitoring and controlling 
tasks that in the Circumpolar North cover vast areas. Public governance is in fact no guarantee 
for achieving sustainable management. 
2. Market Resource Governance 
The logic behind the market resource model is that common resources, despite limited access, 
should be governed by market mechanisms that provide incentives to harvesters to exploit 
resources sustainably. Giving long-term rights to individual users by privatizing common pool 
resources, and through selling and buying rights, market mechanisms will work to solve the 
over-capacity problem. The objective is to replace common rights with private rights to create 
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conditions for self-interest, thereby providing incentives for individuals to avoid ecological and 
economic collapse. In so doing, administrative costs are reduced, and private interests incur 
costs that are concomitant with private benefits. 
Such arguments have been used to privatize fisheries, traditionally common or open access 
resources. Private rights are governed by trade and licenses, and quotas for vessels and catch 
amount. While this model works in theory, there have been cases, such as in Iceland where the 
result has been fewer participants, bigger vessels and centralization. In this example, fishing 
communities lost the right to land fish catches, and vessels, rights and quotas became 
commodities where the strongest bidders secured the majority of fishing rights. 
Market models are not designed to perpetuate existing living or social conditions. Rather, such 
models focus on profit maximization and efficiency:  two aspects of the market model that are 
often deemed unfair. While the market model often creates new structures and business 
arrangements, it is often accompanied by unemployment and displacement for those who are 
less efficient producers. Furthermore, recruitment of new actors depends on financial capacity, 
rather than social standing and community belonging. 
It seems reasonable that actors would 
behave in a rational way to take care 
of long-term interests and to maintain 
resources in perpetuity. Theoretically, 
a private interest will use a resource in 
a way that maximizes a stream of 
benefits over time, and therefore, have 
an interest in acting responsibly 
(Figure 1). Similarly, if a private 
interest wants short-term gains, they 
possess the right to sell, and therefore, 
have a strong incentive to maintain the 
value of the resource. However, there 
is no guarantee that this will happen. 
Profits are shorter term than are 
ecological effects, the latter of which 
are not always easily traceable. 
Turning common pool resources for the first time into 
transferable market rights is complicated and gives 
rise to the problem of determining who gets initial 
rights and what the cost might be for licensing, for 
example. The market governance model also favors 
larger industrial actors for whom profit maximization and efficiency is the driving force. Such 
large operators can achieve economies of scale, and in certain instances, natural monopolies 
can form. Therefore, it is essential to carefully monitor the transition from common pool to private 
resources. 
3. Participatory Resource Governance 
Restrictions on access and exploitation of scarce natural resources lead to situations where 
rules and decisions are questioned and challenged by the affected parties. Is the allocation fair? 
Has all available information been considered? These are examples of two questions asked in 
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northern Norway when coastal fishermen and communities experienced a significant cut in cod 
quotas from 1987 to 1990. Protests that included local councils and even clergymen and 
churches were mobilized to bring about a policy favoring the coastal fisheries and communities. 
People questioned the legitimacy of the policy and challenged the decision-making system. 
A way to reduce tension and increase the legitimacy of a political process is to include 
stakeholders from policy formation to policy implementation. This approach is called participatory 
government or co-management whereby decisions are based on both western scientific 
knowledge and traditional knowledge. Co-management can increase the legitimacy of resource 
policy formation and management because more consideration can be given to local 
communities, indigenous rights and specific concerns. While this organizational model is often 
seen as an alternative to market rule, it is desirable where discourse among participants is 
preferred. 
This model is also based on the state’s authority to rule and make legally binding decisions. The 
state remains the basic actor but chooses to cooperate with the affected parties in an organized 
way, providing information and legitimacy to the policy process and its outcomes. Such a model 
provides great variations in the degree of delegation of authority to lower levels of government, 
and even to a participatory body itself, yet the state is ultimately responsible; and science-based 
information is at the core of the knowledge platform. 
Participatory government is largely dependent on domestic political cultures that vary by state 
and are influenced by cooperating parties. Co-management regimes tend to favor long-term 
rationality, fair distribution and, increased legitimacy. However, the effectiveness of this model 
depends on how well stakeholders and user groups are balanced, the extent to which advice is 
taken, and the degree to which parties are pursing similar objectives. Ultimately, the choice of 
model is a question of politics, and the state of the resource. 
8.4. International Cooperation and Sustainable Resource Development 
International cooperation is important for sustainable resource development because often, 
resources are shared by nations. There are many ecological systems that span national borders, 
and many resources that do not belong to any nation. Good examples of these characteristics 
are found in many of the world’s fisheries. International fishing vessels are often registered in 
remote states with no quota rights, and have for many years fished in international waters in the 
north, beyond national control and where bilateral treaties do not exist. Access to fish stocks has 
been open, leading to significant depletion and sometimes, extinction (Figure 2). During the last 
decade there has been growing pressure on northern fish stocks driven by globalization and 
decreases in transportation costs. To address overfishing it became important to secure property 
rights and move from open access to public ownership. In so doing, the northern nation states 
established exclusive economic zones by extending jurisdiction of adjacent sea areas from four 
nautical miles to 200 nautical miles, rooted in the Law of the Sea principles.  
The fishing example illustrates the tragedy of the commons, and the importance of secure 
property rights and adaptive management in sustaining resources while pursing responsible 
resource development. Also important is the requirement for international cooperation and 
agreement to developing solutions, through international law and conventions often headed by 
the United Nations. As a result, while most of the world’s fish stocks are being overexploited, fish 
stocks in the Barents Sea are being managed sustainably as a direct result of international and 
bi-lateral cooperation. 
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Resource stewardship is integral to environmental policy making and economic development, 
and is an international issue that requires coordinated actions across world communities. Many 
problems have to be addressed at the international level and cannot be solved nationally or 
bilaterally. The United Nations (UN) has for that reason been an important institution for 
recognizing environmental challenges and in its policy-making role to promote sustainable 
development. 
 !The first UN conference on this 
issue was held in Stockholm, 
Sweden, in 1972, leading to the 
World Commission on 
Environment and Development, 
headed by the Norwegian minister 
for environmental affairs, Gro 
Harlem Brundtland. The work of 
this committee, often referred to 
as the “Brundtland-commission,” 
submitted the final report, “Our 
Common Future” in 1987, 
suggesting that environmental 
issues be targeted by the world 
community. This work was 
followed up at the Rio Conference 
in 1992, United Nations 
Conference on Environment and  
 
 
Development (UNCED), resulting in 
the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, Guiding Principles for Management of 
Forests, Agenda 21, and two important international conventions on climate and world 
biodiversity. 
The Rio meeting represented a major step forward in setting the world’s environmental agenda 
and contributed with important approaches to safeguard sustainable environmental development 
and use of natural resources. The Rio Declaration espoused sustainable natural resource 
development, avoidance of environmental damage and the use of the precautionary principle 
where scientific knowledge was lacking. The signatory states committed to pass domestic laws 
to protect nature and the environment and to mobilize their citizens to engage in environmental 
work. In summary, the Rio Declaration laid down important principles for further environmental 
action at the international, national and local levels. Agenda 21 was devoted to protection and 
stewardship of natural resources; the Convention on Biodiversity committed the signatories to 
protect, allocate and extract natural resources in sustainable ways while the Climate Convention 
focused on the need to protect the world climate—essential for the sustainability of northern 
ecosystems. 
!"#$%&'6)''7100-/8&'12'*90-+9":':1;'891:<8'+&-%'=&>21$+;0-+;'"+'(??65''
!"#$%&'((
)**+',,&-./010+&203."$4,/010,506&'!#$&B+6"0*3*0"-C?"$#&CD#$+EAFEGG%)&
H-.I+4((;#=60%(>"?30-.(G#*)"$'((J3?0"*'''
(
!! "#!
National environmental policies started to flourish in the 1970s in the wake of the UN’s work on 
sustainable development, and have grown in importance since the UN meeting in Rio in 1992. 
Environmental non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have emerged as a driving force to 
pressure public authorities and the international community. Furthermore, NGOs have had a 
major effect on raising awareness and initiating public debate that sometimes results in civil 
disobedience. The necessity of public debate and engagement cannot be understated when it 
comes to forming and implementing environmental policies, of which sustainable resource 
stewardship is an integral part. Additionally, a free press to criticize and support public 
authorities, and thereby set political agendas, is a precondition for public engagement in 
environmental issues. 
Recently all of the Arctic Council countries have accepted environmental NGOs who cooperate 
at international levels, thus changing the balance of political pressure. With the growing number 
of states ratifying UN conventions, including the Arctic states (with the exception of the US), 
international commitments and national political pressure has increased to protect, preserve and 
manage the environment and natural resources in a sustainable way. 
8.5. Constraints to Implementing the Precautionary Principle 
Establishing national reserves, protected areas and national parks has a long tradition in the 
Circumpolar North as a means of environmental protection. In these cases, indigenous rights 
are often given special status although national policies vary, ranging from total protection to 
various degrees of exploitation by well-defined stakeholders. Given competing interests for a 
resource, planning is often used to resolve conflicts and to allocate resources in a way that 
seeks to protect environments. States have different traditions as to the scope and use of 
planning as a managing means. The Nordic states have a long planning and regulatory tradition 
to prevent conflict, while other states are more inclined to seek the same objectives through 
legal systems. 
When including many different stakeholders with competing views over a resource, it is 
sometimes difficult to develop a management plan that ensures resources will be sustainable.  
This is particularly true where traditional rights to resources have been observed, but over time, 
resource availability has decreased given rising demand. In these cases, restricting harvesting 
could be contentious and adhering to the precautionary principle difficult, or impossible.  
Sustainable resource stewardship is also dependent on political culture and international 
commitments, and the domestic legal means available to form and implement policies. The rule 
of law is essential for all democracies and also for resource stewardship. However, although 
laws and practices must be regarded as legitimate, outcomes do not always favor sustainability. 
There must also be efficient implementation, policing and control systems; activities that call for 
state authority and economic resources. The Circumpolar North has vast areas of land and sea, 
and efficient resource control is sometimes difficult, especially in international waters where 
resources are not legally owned until captured.  
Conclusion 
Resource stewardship in the Circumpolar North has no doubt become more complex and 
challenging in the new millennium, especially with respect to the oceans. There is a need for 
improved ecosystem management and to include both regulatory policies for the extraction of 
non-renewable resources and the effects of climate change. Because new knowledge and 
scientific discovery is continually underway, society should not exploit resources too hastily; the 
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principle of precaution and adaptive ecosystem management should be two basic pillars of all 
resource management plans to ensure the good stewardship of circumpolar resources. 
(
Study Questions  
1. What is meant by the concept “common pool resources”? What is the rationale of “the 
tragedy of the commons” - are people rational in their behavior to over exploit resources? 
2. Give an example of each of the three natural resource management models. 
3. Explain the economic and environmental effects of increased use on natural resources. 
4. How do the UN’s conventions affect sustainable management of natural resources? 
5. How can the nation states contribute to sustainable resource stewardship? 
6. From the Required Reading, synthesize Caulfield’s perspectives and conclusions in the Arctic 
Human Development Report on knowledge systems. 
 
Glossary 
Adaptive management: Flexible management of an ecosystem or resource in the case of 
political, economic or biological changes, for example. 
Co-management: Devolution of power where public authorities include stakeholders to be a 
formal part policymaking and policy implementation. 
Collective rationality: Rational behavior for a group pursuing social, collective or public goals. 
Common pool resources: A resource held by a limited number of stakeholders often defined 
as the commons.  This group can exploit common pool, or common property resources. 
Ecosystem management: Management of an ecosystem rather than single species within an 
ecosystem. 
Ecosystem: A community of living species and the relationship to their environment. 
Individual rationality: A concept used to describe the behavior of an individual pursuing 
individual goals that maximize self-interest. 
Limited access: Use and access for only stakeholders. 
Precautionary Principle:  Taking action that postpones or diminishes use or extraction until 
resources sustainability is known with more certainty. 
Resource rent: an economic term describing the value of a resource net of all costs. 
Sustainable development: A concept introduced by the Brundtland Commission that describes 
development that meets present demands without harming future generations’ demands. 
Tenure: Rights to resources, and more generally, rights to assets. 
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Tragedy of the Commons: A term defined by Garret Hardin that describes where stakeholders 
act on self interest to maximize their own profit when extracting common pool resources. When 
all stakeholders act in this way it will lead to over-exploitation of a resource and resource 
depletion. 
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